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Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents
A Response to Meurer and Nard
Doug Lichtman*
The scope of a patent is principally determined by the literal language of the
patent claims. After a patent issues, however, patent holders have at their
disposal a handful of mechanisms by which to expand patent scope beyond
those original contours. One such mechanism is the doctrine of equivalents.
Under that doctrine, a patent holder can, in the context of an infringement action,
ask a court to reinterpret claim language to cover not only that which the claim
literally describes but also similar inventions that perform “substantially the
same function, in substantially the same way, to obtain substantially the same
result.”1 Another such mechanism is the reissue proceeding, under which a
patent holder can turn instead to the Patent Office and, albeit subject to some
hefty restrictions, ask that new claim language be considered.2 Yet another
mechanism involves follow‐up applications know as “continuations” through
which an applicant can submit new claims that will under certain circumstances
be treated as if they were submitted at the time of the original application.3 These
various mechanisms are each substitutes not only for one another, but also for
more careful claim drafting at the outset. That is, a patent applicant seeking
particular scope to some degree trades off between these options, deciding how
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Email: dgl@uchicago.edu. For helpful
comments, sincere thanks to John Duffy, Ed McCaffery, Rob Merges, Mike Meurer, Craig Nard,
Neil Netanel and also workshop participants at Berkeley, UCLA, and USC.
1 This is one of the classic articulations of the doctrine. Its words are drawn from Graver Tank
& Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). Another common
phrasing is to ask whether there are “insubstantial differences” between the accused and claimed
inventions. See Warner‐Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39‐40 (1997)
(noting the two articulations but refusing to choose between them).
2 See 35 U.S.C. § 251.
3 See 35 U.S.C. § 120.
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much to invest in the process of drafting original claim language, how much to
rely on the doctrine of equivalents, and whether and when to make use of both
the reissue proceeding and continuation applications.4
From a policy perspective, the first step toward evaluating any of these
mechanisms is to ask whether a patent applicant would be able to achieve the
same patent scope in a world without the mechanism in question. For example,
to evaluate the doctrine of equivalents, ask whether an applicant can use
continuations, the reissue proceeding, and more careful claim drafting to achieve
the precise coverage otherwise available under the doctrine. Similarly, to
evaluate continuation applications, determine first whether the doctrine of
equivalents, reissue, and more careful claim drafting can together accomplish the
very same work. If analysis along these lines suggests that the mechanism in
question is redundant, the implication is not that the mechanism has no value.
Instead, the implication is that patent scope is not at stake with respect to that
mechanism, and its contours should therefore be based exclusively on
institutional factors like the relative cost to the applicant of using it; the relative
cost to courts and competitors of evaluating patent scope in light of it; and any
resulting differences in the allocation of decision‐making power as between the
Patent Office and the federal courts, or as between judge and jury. If analysis
along these lines suggests that a mechanism is not redundant, by contrast, then
patent scope is at stake, and the mechanism at issue therefore unavoidably
implicates more fundamental questions about what scope of protection best
balances society’s competing interests in invention, disclosure, coordination, and
imitation.

Other substitute mechanisms are also in play, such as the use of the means‐plus‐function
element format. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
4
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Mike Meurer and Craig Nard do not explicitly adopt this framework in
Invention, Refinement, and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of
Equivalents,5 but they in essence argue that the doctrine of equivalents is
redundant in the sense introduced above. More specifically, they argue that the
doctrine in most cases has no effect on patent scope because patent applicants
can achieve the relevant range of protection by drafting more inclusive claims at
the outset and by using the reissue proceeding to fill any remaining gaps.6 This
leads Meurer and Nard to think that the normative justification for equivalents
analysis must primarily lie in the relative costs of using the doctrine as compared
to its substitute mechanisms. Thus they develop a normative theory that turns
heavily on institutional factors,7 and they ultimately advocate both a significant
reduction in the availability of equivalents protection8 and a renewed emphasis
on claim drafting and the reissue proceeding.9
I write this Response to warmly but wholeheartedly disagree.
I begin in Part I by arguing that the doctrine of equivalents is first and
foremost a doctrine about patent scope. Applicants cannot replicate its effects by
investing more heavily in efforts at original claim drafting, nor can they muddle

[x] GEO. L. J. [xxx] (2005) [hereinafter “Refinement”].
Meurer and Nard do recognize some exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g., Refinement at [8]
(certain unforeseen variations are “conceptually unattainable no matter the amount of time and
money spent on refinement efforts”). However, this is the insight that animates their theory and
drives their economic model. See, e.g., Refinement at [7] (“we show that often the degree of
competition is unaffected by the presence or absence of the [doctrine of equivalents]”); id. at [8]
(“often patent applicants can capture unforeseen embodiments through greater conceptual effort
and the use of various claim drafting strategies”).
7 See Refinement at [31‐40] (articulating their economic model of equivalents analysis).
8 See, e.g., Refinement at [3] (application of the doctrine of equivalents should be “the exception
. . . not the rule”) (quoting London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
9 See, e.g., Refinement at [4] (“there is not a convincing answer to the question of why the
doctrine of equivalents, rather than some other doctrinal approach, should be used”); id. at [5]
(discussing claim refinement); id. at 40‐42 (discussing the reissue proceeding).
5
6
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through by making more active use of the reissue proceeding or continuation
applications. To suggest otherwise is not only to significantly understate the
difficulty of identifying and articulating the essence of a genuinely new
invention but also to neglect important differences between determining
appropriate claim scope at the moment of invention and undertaking that same
task years later when a genuine controversy is at hand. Put succinctly, Meurer
and Nard are in my view wrong to think that the doctrine of equivalents is a
redundant mechanism, and they are therefore wrong to conclude that the
normative justification for the doctrine must come from its institutional
implications rather than its effect on patent scope. Institutional details matter, but
in this setting they likely take second seat to the more central question of how
broad patent protection should be.
In Part II, I put questions of patent scope to one side and turn to the
institutional issues. As Meurer and Nard suggest, mechanisms that reduce the
costs of drafting a patent application often increase the costs of reading and
interpreting it. That said, the institutional analysis is significantly more
complicated than Meurer and Nard let on. For one thing, the costs of drafting
bulletproof claim language can be substantial. Every change in isolation might
seem small and manageable, but the dynamic overall can readily add up.
Moreover, the benefits of marginally improving claim language do not seem
particularly large. Most patents, after all, are never read. And even among those
patents that are read, slightly imperfect claim language is not as important as it
might at first seem. For instance, someone skilled in the relevant art can often
correctly interpret a patent claim despite some number of literal imperfections. In
fact, someone skilled in the art might find it easier to read simple, concrete claim
language (“shoelace”) rather than more abstract expressions (“mechanism by

5
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which to bind tightly around the foot”) that are technically superior but in
practice harder to construe.
In Part III, I consider two special topics that Meurer and Nard also stress.
Specifically, I discuss the use of equivalents analysis to extend claim scope in
instances where the accused technology uses some component that was not
invented at the time the original claim language was drafted; and I discuss the
relationship between the Patent Office and the federal courts, focusing in
particular on how that relationship might change if Meurer and Nard are
successful in their efforts to increase the importance of literal claim language
while at the same time reducing the availability of the doctrine of equivalents.
Finally, in Part IV, I briefly conclude, presenting my own perspective on the
doctrine of equivalents and its role in patent interpretation.
I. A Question of Patent Scope
Mike Meurer and Craig Nard are completely upfront about the assumption
that motivates their normative theory: “We believe that inventors fail to obtain
the full claim breadth [to which] they are entitled . . . because they fail to refine
their claims sufficiently during patent prosecution.”10 It is with respect to this
basic point that I disagree most strongly. Meurer and Nard imagine that
applicants are capable of writing comprehensive literal claims but are choosing
instead to cut corners and then rely on the doctrine of equivalents for protection.
In my view, that is not a believable account. Accurate claim language is not
always within reach. And, while the reissue process and continuation
applications do mitigate the problem, these are in the end significantly imperfect
substitutes for the flexibility otherwise available under the doctrine of
equivalents.
10

Refinement at [5].
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Start with the difficulties inherent in drafting literal claim language. Every
year, I begin my patent course by asking students to imagine that they have been
hired to draft a set of comprehensive claims articulating that invention
commonly known as the pencil.11 The task is as easy as a drafting exercise can
possibly be, in that every one of my students has well over twenty years of
experience working with this invention, and each has also already seen major
variations on the pencil theme, including the mechanical pencil, the colored
pencil, and those pencils that come in the shape of a heart, or Mickey Mouse ears,
or a banana. Still, every year, writing a set of comprehensive claims proves to be
a nearly insurmountable challenge for the class. How best to articulate that non‐
transferable exterior substance, remembering that it need not be made of wood,
need not come in the shape of a stylus, and yet in most instantiations should be
removable in a way that enables or emulates sharpening? What of the
transferable inner core that must be contained within the exterior substance but
also capable of protruding from it? And the eraser? Six years into teaching and
with the help of well over 500 student collaborators, I am still not convinced that
I have in my possession airtight patent claims for the pencil. And, as I say, the
pencil represents the easiest of drafting exercises because both the invention and
its various commercial embodiments are utterly familiar.
Outside the classroom, the deck is not so generously stacked. Consider in
this light the patent portfolio held by Tessera Technologies. Tessera is a
sophisticated patent player that licenses its patented technologies to firms like
Sharp Electronics, Texas Instruments, and Samsung.12 The firm raised nearly
$100 million when it went public in 2003, and its principal asset was then and is

The inspiration is an exercise in ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW: CASES
(3rd ed. 2002).
12 Detailed information about the firm can be found at http://www.tessera.com.
11

AND MATERIALS 33‐35
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still today its intellectual property.13 Yet a recent patent dispute suggests that
even in this patent‐focused, high‐stakes environment, it is not reasonable to
expect that every ‘t’ can be crossed and every ‘i’ can be dotted. The patent at
issue was meant to protect a semiconductor housing that physically connects
semiconductor chips to their associated circuit boards. The innovative
accomplishment is that the housing allows for some flexibility at the point of
contact, thereby accommodating temperature changes and other environmental
stresses that would otherwise cause the board to shift position and lose contact.
A representative claim begins by carefully asserting rights in a “semiconductor
chip assembly comprising a semiconductor chip having a plurality of surfaces
and having contacts on at least one of said surfaces and a flexible sheetlike
element having terminals thereon, and flexible leads electrically connecting said
terminals to said contacts”14—language, it turns out, that inadvertently leaves
ambiguous the important question of whether flexibility is a property of these
various components in their unassembled state, their assembled state, or both.15
In the hands of an unsympathetic court, that blunder could cost Tessera millions;
yet it is hard to fault Tessera’s attorneys, who surely had their hands full
perfecting the rest of that unwieldy 104‐word descriptive articulation.
The Tessera anecdote is in no way exceptional. Sophisticated firms with real
money on the line nevertheless routinely fail to craft literal claims that properly
articulate their inventive accomplishments. Thus millions of dollars are at risk
because patentees have repeatedly described computer processes as “selectively
forwarding” data from a central computer to remote clients, not realizing that

Therese Poletti, Newly Public Tessera a Mix of Technology and Strategy, MERCURY NEWS,
Dec. 13, 2003 (reporting on the IPO).
14 U.S. Patent No. 5,679,977 (1997) (claim 1).
15 See Samsung’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief, Samsung Electronics Corporation, Ltd.
v. Tessera Technologies, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2003) at 9 (making this argument).
13
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language of that sort leaves unprotected comparable systems where the data is
not forwarded but instead remains in the central computer waiting to be picked
up.16 Computer enthusiasts will recognize this to be the difference between
“push” and “pull” technology, a concept that had not been clearly defined back
when most of the relevant patentees first applied for protection. Similarly, the
Federal Circuit recently ruled against a patentee whose claims used the word
“adjoining” to describe the proximity of two components.17 The problem,
according to the court, is that “adjoining” strongly implies some form of contact
or touching, and all the invention actually required was that the relevant
components be “adjacent” or nearby.
Should failures like these be interpreted as avoidable errors—as decisions
made by these various inventors not to invest in further claim refinement?
Again, Meurer and Nard think so: “We believe that inventors fail to obtain the
full claim breadth they are entitled to because they fail to refine their claims
sufficiently during patent prosecution.”18 Quite the opposite, my position is that
Tessera and its peers fall short because it is impossible for a patent applicant to
anticipate every insubstantial variation that a competitor might try, let alone to
articulate in general and abstract terms every detail of a genuinely new
invention. Put differently, without the doctrine of equivalents, patent protection
would be a remarkably thin reed. Copyists would need only identify a single
weakness in a claim and then they would be free to adopt the relevant variation
and infringe with impunity. And inadvertent infringers, too, would from time to
time stumble into variations that, due to a failure in the original claim language,

Two among many examples are U.S. Patent Nos. 4,644,468 (1987) & 5,305,310 (1994).
International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F. 3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
18 Refinement at [5].
16
17
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would also happen to fall outside the patent’s scope.19 The doctrine of
equivalents responds to these contingencies. On this view, it is not some excuse
that patent applicants strategically use to cut corners. It is instead in many
instances the only way to offer inventors meaningful patent protection.
My comments thus far focus on literal claim drafting as an alternative to the
doctrine of equivalents; but little changes when we expand the analysis to
consider in addition both the reissue proceeding and the possibility of
continuation applications. There are two reasons. First, like original claim
drafting itself, the reissue proceeding and continuation applications both require
that an inventor write appropriate literal language early in the inventive process.
This is in sharp contrast to the doctrine of equivalents which typically applies
years later, when there is an actual controversy at hand. Reissue is most limiting
on this score: it can only be used to expand claim scope during the first two years
after patent issuance.20 But continuations are not completely flexible either. A
first continuation application must be filed before the associated original
application results in an issued patent,21 and that first continuation will typically
run its course within a few years.22 An applicant can file additional continuations
after the first,23 and in theory the chain can proceed without end, but in practice
an applicant must have some plausible reason to keep a continuation alive or the
Patent Office will reject it. Worse, an applicant who uses the continuation
Remember: unlike trade secret law, patent law does not tolerate independent invention. An
infringer who innocently stumbles into a patent’s scope is subject to legal liability, just like an
infringer who knowingly enters that same domain. Of course, damages in the latter case are
typically higher, at least if the copyist can be shown to have acted willfully.
20 See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (“No reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope of the claims of
the original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant of the original patent.”).
21 See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (a continuation application is acceptable only “if filed before the
patenting or abandonment of or termination of proceedings on the first application”).
22 For the statistics and an interesting discussion, see Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore,
Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63 (2004).
23 See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (discussing the possibility of multiple applications).
19
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strategy too aggressively might find himself the proud owner of a patent that is
unenforceable on grounds of inequitable conduct—a lesson that might soon be
learned by GemStar‐TV Guide International, whose patents related to interactive
television program selection technologies form an outrageous web of strategic
continuation applications, the overwhelming majority of which were abandoned
only to be replaced by the next repetitive filing.24
Second, the reissue proceeding and continuation applications cannot
possibly offer protection as broad as that available under the doctrine of
equivalents, simply because a finding of equivalents is retroactive whereas these
other mechanisms are largely forward‐looking. Unpacking that a bit: when a
court announces that some accused product is equivalent to the patented
invention, the remedies available are exactly the ones that would have been
available had the accused product literally infringed. In both cases, the infringer
is liable for damages for past infringement. In both cases, the infringer is subject
to injunctive relief with respect to any on‐going activities. By contrast, when
claim scope is expanded during the reissue proceeding, damages cannot be
collected for past transgressions that infringe the new claims but not the old
ones;25 and, more important, the court has the authority to permit continuing acts
of infringement “under such terms as the court deems equitable for the
protection of investments made or business commenced before the grant of the
reissue.”26 Continuation applications similarly let slip a class of infringers. Claims
included in a continuation application are effective on a forward‐looking basis

[Lichtman will add links on this; the patent office website is down this week]
35 U.S.C. § 252 (explaining the effect of the reissue proceeding).
26 Id.
24
25
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and—except in unusual circumstances—cannot be used to recover for activities
that occur before the continuation patent issues.27
In summary, then, Mike Meurer, Craig Nard, and I disagree over a core
assumption: they imagine that comprehensive claim scope is almost always
within reach, either through careful efforts at original claim drafting or through
after‐the‐fact use of the reissue proceeding and continuation applications,
whereas I think it is virtually impossible to write a bulletproof claim or to
simulate that outcome by making do with the reissue and continuation
alternatives. If I am right, then a world without the doctrine of equivalents is a
world of narrower patent scope. That might be a good thing—patent protection
is plausibly too broad as it stands today and a legal change that narrows patent
scope might beneficially pare patent protection down28—but it at the same time
calls into question the normative account Meurer and Nard provide, an account
that emphasizes institutional concerns but does so at the expense of difficult and
more fundamental questions about patent scope.
II. Institutional Details
Although I believe that issues of patent scope are the central concern that
should motivate any normative theory of the doctrine of equivalents, I do not by
The Patent Act does allow a patent holder to recover for infringements that take place after a
continuation application is published but before the continuation application matures into an
issued patent. However, infringements are actionable under this rule only if (a) the infringer had
actual notice of the published continuation application and (b) the invention claimed in the
ultimate patent is “substantially identical” to the invention claimed in the published continuation
application. Even when these conditions are met, the only remedy available to the patentee is a
reasonable royalty. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d). I describe the use of these “provisional rights” as an
unusual circumstance because, to date, there are no reported cases where a patent holder has
successfully invoked them.
28 Although there are better responses to that problem, such as a strengthening of the non‐
obviousness requirement, a rethinking of the Patent Office’s internal structure, and the creation
of a more useful post‐grant opposition procedure. For discussion along these lines, see ADAM B.
JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS : HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).
27
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that mean to suggest that institutional details are unimportant. The doctrine of
equivalents, the reissue proceeding, continuation applications, and more intense
efforts at literal claim drafting do each offer different tradeoffs between the costs
an applicant must face in articulating claim scope and the costs courts and
competitors must incur in interpreting the resulting patent documents. In this
section, I therefore consider costs from both perspectives, in the end questioning
whether Meurer and Nard are right on these grounds to paint the doctrine of
equivalents as the ugly duckling of the scope‐articulation flock.
I should make clear at the outset that I find it difficult to have this
conversation about institutional factors as they might exist apart from issues of
patent scope, in that to me the topics are hopelessly intertwined. If the doctrine
of equivalents reduces the costs of claim drafting, for example, would not that
reduction in cost lead to an increase in the number of patent applications filed
and thus a corresponding increase in the reach of the patent system? If so, how
can we evaluate that change without having a more general theory about
whether an increase is desirable, and a companion theory about whether low
barriers to patenting increase monopoly power by creating more exclusive grants
or decrease monopoly power by increasing the number of competing patent
holders? But this is my general theme—the doctrine of equivalents is a rule about
patent scope—and so I will now put those puzzles aside and focus more
narrowly on the institutional issues that Meurer and Nard rightly recognize as
also important.
One way in which the doctrine of equivalents, reissue, and continuation
applications reduce costs is by reducing the pressure to write perfect literal
claims. These mechanisms are safety nets, and they to varying degrees stop a
wasteful arms race in which copyists spend excessively on meaningless attempts

13
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to skirt literal claim language and applicants respond by upping the ante with
respect to their attempts to craft the ideal phrase. The doctrine of equivalents is
likely the most effective of the various mechanisms in question because it
obviates the need to ever actually write the necessary claim language. Under the
other mechanisms, an inventor must spend money updating his claim terms
every time a new literal loophole is discovered, although perhaps not too often if
copyists anticipate this pattern and decide that short windows of permissible
infringement are not sufficiently worthwhile.29
Another way in which these mechanisms reduce costs is by allowing
applicants to postpone some of the work of scope articulation. This has value for
two reasons. First, a system that allows for gradual investments in refinement
also allows for resources to be conserved in instances where the patented
technology turns out to be a commercial dud. Failures like this are surprisingly
common—many patents are revealed to be worthless within a few years after
issuance30—and so the savings here could be significant. Second, because it is
typically easier to articulate the essence of an invention after experience has
made clear the technology’s core attributes, delay is valuable simply because it
gives inventors more time to gain experience with their inventions. Consider, for
example, how hard it would have been two decades ago to describe the Internet
in clear but abstract terms, and then compare that with the difficulty of
undertaking the same task today, now that ecommerce, blogging, and other

Arms races like this one raise a number of interesting policy questions. I will not say more
here, but I discuss the topic at length in Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self‐Help, 1
J.L. ECON. & POLICY 215, 225‐38 (2005).
30 See Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW
REVIEW 1495 (2001) (arguing that most issued patents disappear after issuance, never to be
invoked in either a licensing or litigation context).
29
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online activities have rendered clear the technology’s central features.31 With
respect to both of these considerations, note that the doctrine of equivalents
enables greater cost savings than do the reissue and continuation alternatives,
this time because (1) the doctrine of equivalents allows for a longer delay
between filing and refinement and (2) the doctrine is naturally invoked only in
the information‐rich litigation setting.
I have focused thus far on cost reductions; turn now to cost increases. As
Meurer and Nard stress,32 the doctrine of equivalents, the reissue proceeding,
and the possibility of continuation applications all make it more difficult for
competitors and other interested constituencies to anticipate the precise scope of
an issued patent claim. This is in essence a notice problem, and it admittedly
must be weighed against the savings considered above. That said, for several
reasons, I worry that Meurer and Nard overstate this concern.
First, even in a world without any of these various flexible mechanisms,
notice would still be a significant problem. The Markman hearing, for instance, is

Patent doctrines often take advantage of information that was not available at the time of
patent prosecution but is available at the time of litigation. For example, section 103 of the Patent
Act excludes from patent protection any invention that is “obvious” in light of the prior art. 35
U.S.C. § 103. At the time of patent prosecution, obviousness is largely judged on paper: the
purported invention is compared to similar inventions previously described in patents, news
articles, and other sources. In court, however, obviousness is in addition evaluated in light of
information like how well the purported invention sold, whether competitors copied the
technology after it was unveiled, and whether the invention was received by industry experts
with praise or skepticism. The Federal Circuit in fact requires that these factors be considered in
every case and has described them as “the most pertinent, probative, and revealing evidence
available” on the question of obviousness. W. L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d
1540, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984). Obviously, information about sales,
competitor activity, and the like is information that is typically not available until some time after
the patent issues.
32 See, e.g., Refinement at [6] (“the uncertainty about patent rights created by the doctrine
undermines the notice function of the patent”).
31
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a hearing typically conducted at the start of patent litigation.33 Its purpose is to
provide an opportunity for the court to clarify any ambiguities in the literal claim
language and then to adopt a definitive interpretation of the patent’s words.
These hearings focus exclusively on literal meaning; yet, as every participant in
the patent system well knows, they are hugely contentious. Almost all patents, it
turns out, have significant latent ambiguities—even with respect to seemingly
innocuous words like “to,” “on,” “about”, and “through.”34 The Federal Circuit is
right now grappling with this problem, specifically struggling to articulate rules
for when dictionaries should be used to clarify ambiguous literal terms and
which dictionaries in particular should be trusted in various circumstances.35 The
scholarly community is also working to think through aspects of this notice
problem, with Dan Burk, Mark Lemley, Joseph Miller, Polk Wagner, and others

The hearing takes its name from Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370
(1996).
34 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 53
(2005) (collecting cases where the Federal Circuit had to decide “plausible disagreements” over
the meanings of these words). For some other evidence in similar spirit, see Kimberly A. Moore,
Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2001)
(documenting the frequency with which the Federal Circuit reverses lower court claim
constructions); Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004) (showing how judges at the
Federal Circuit themselves often squabble over the meaning of words and the methodologies by
which to determine meaning in the first place).
35 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (order granting rehearing and
framing various questions about dictionary use). Several commentators have suggested that the
Federal Circuit either choose a default dictionary that will apply in all cases, or obligate each
patent applicant to choose their own default dictionary at the time of patent application. See, e.g.,
Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles & Rules for Dictionaries at the
Patent Office and the Courts, 54 American U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2005). The argument in favor of
these approaches is that they would help to quickly resolve any dispute about the meaning of an
ambiguous term. The argument against is that this approach commits the patent system to a
random answer—what some arbitrary dictionary says—and does so in instances where, by
assumption, neither the patent examiner not the applicant foresaw the particular ambiguity now
in dispute. An alternative approach would be to allow the court to choose from among the
several available definitions and in that way make the choice with an eye toward the relevant
implications.
33
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all recently writing papers on point.36 What this means for Meurer and Nard is
not only that it might be unfair to blame the doctrine of equivalents, the reissue
proceeding, and continuation applications for the patent system’s notice
problems, but also that it might be overly optimistic to imagine that reducing
reliance on those mechanisms would much improve the situation.37
Second, notice is a relevant consideration only to the extent that patents are
actually read; and in reality very few patents are. As I have already hinted
briefly, most patents sit idle after issuance, never brought into litigation and
never used as the basis for licensing negotiations.38 Moreover, very few people
read patents outside of the litigation and licensing contexts. The risks are just too
high: if you read a patent and then either yourself infringe or in some way help
another party to infringe, you are vulnerable to charges of either willful39 or
contributory40 infringement, respectively. Ignorance, on the other hand, is an
absolute defense.41 Thus, because patents are both rarely asserted and rarely
read, it is probably inefficient to expend significant resources improving patent

See Burk & Lemley, supra note 34 (emphasizing the indeterminacy of literal claim language);
Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 35 (exploring ambiguity that arises because even dictionaries
offer inconsistent definitions for a claim term); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 34
(emphasizing the different approaches to claim construction).
37 The patent system is deeply unpredictable in other ways as well. For instance, juries are well
known to be a wildcard in patent cases. Accord Refinement at [27 n.153].
38 Unlicensed and unlitigated patents are not necessarily worthless. They might have served as
insurance policies, for example, protecting against infringement that turned out not to
materialize. Alternatively, they might have served as valuable signals about the associated
inventors or firms. See Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002). Cf. John R.
Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore. & R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J.
435 (2004) (adopting a remarkably narrow definition of value that excludes patents of this sort).
39 See 35 U.S.C. § 284. As I have argued before, this strikes me as an awful rule—one that
should be replaced by an objective “knew or should have known” standard. See Mark A. Lemley
& Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1115
(2003) (noting my suggestion and evaluating its strengths and weaknesses).
40 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
41 Interestingly, ignorance does increase the chance of accidental infringement, because it is
hard to avoid a legal right of which one is not aware.
36
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clarity across the board. The costs will be incurred for every patent, but the
benefits will be realized only in rare cases.42
Third, to whatever extent the notice problem is relevant, it is not as
important as it might at first seem, because someone skilled in the relevant art
can often correctly interpret a patent claim despite some number of literal
imperfections. Accused infringers, for instance, in many cases know full well that
their products or services are insubstantially different from some patented
invention. Indeed, these are the fact patterns that the Supreme Court had in mind
when it famously described the doctrine of equivalents as a necessary counter to
“the unscrupulous copyist” who “like one who seeks to pirate a copyrighted
book or play, may be expected to introduce minor variations to conceal and
shelter the piracy.”43 Yes, the doctrine of equivalents will sometimes surprise
infringers by embracing unexpected inventions. But in many conflicts the scope
of the relevant claim is painfully obvious, despite some clumsy words and a
scope that is literally too narrow.44
Fourth, some of the techniques that might reduce the notice problem at the
same time threaten to increase the costs associated with interpreting patent
claims. For instance, tripling the length of a patent claim might plausibly
It is a common misconception to think that the patent system promotes disclosure and
dissemination through the written patent document, but that is clearly not right. As I point out in
the text, patents are rarely ever read. And, as a frustrated Supreme Court once noted, patent
applicants have over time mastered “the highly developed art of drafting patent [disclosures] so
that they disclose as little useful information as possible.” Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534
(1966). The better view is to recognize that the patent system promotes disclosure by creating
legal rights. Those rights reduce the risk that a patented idea will be stolen by rivals; and that
frees the relevant inventor to scream his idea from the mountaintops rather than keeping it quiet
so as to protect it from unauthorized use. Disclosure is thus a dynamic process in the patent
system, not a process that takes place on paper or in patent archives.
43 Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 US 605, 607 (1950).
44 I tpyically mkae tihs piont in clsas by using a snteence lkie tihs one—a snetence rife wtih
literal ipmerfections but one tatt nevretheless is easliy itnerpreted by somoene with sikll in the
rleevant art.
42
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introduce extra details that would make the claim’s contours more precise, but
that change would also greatly increase the costs associated with reading and
construing the claim language. Similarly, introducing additional claims45 and
describing patented products both directly and by articulating the process of
producing them46 would likely increase patent clarity, but again at the cost of
substantial excess clutter. Whether that tradeoff is on balance attractive seems to
me a difficult empirical question. It is entirely possible that the various
constituencies that read patents might actually prefer to suffer with a little more
ambiguity rather than to commit more resources to the task of parsing
overwhelmingly explicit patent documents.
Fifth and perhaps most importantly, restricting the availability of the
doctrine of equivalents might just lead to more abstract claim drafting; and, if
that happens, the notice problem will not be much improved. Would competitors
be put on better notice if, in a claim for the tennis shoe, the patent holder were to
replace the word “shoelace” with the more generic term “fastener”47 or the
descriptive phrase “mechanism by which to bind and relax”?48 These latter
options certainly embrace wider literal scope than does the original, and perhaps
they would be interpreted to yield the same scope as would be achieved by
applying the doctrine of equivalents to the word “shoelace.” But do these other
phrasings really give better notice as to what is and is not protected? I think not.
Readers of this hypothetical claim arguably get a better sense of patent scope by
But see Refinement at [24] (favoring the use of “multiple independent and dependent
claims”).
46 But see id. (favoring the use of product‐by‐process claims).
47 An applicant might be reluctant to use this particular term, because a court could read it as
“means of fastening” and then import all the doctrinal baggage typically associated with means‐
plus‐function claiming. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶6.
48 Let alone the introduction of a new word—maybe “squiggle‐dos”—invented just for the
purposes of the patent claim. But see Refinement at [24] (suggesting that inventors should more
often act as their own lexicographers).
45
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seeing the word “shoelace” and knowing to implicitly insert the phrase “and
equivalents” than they do by reading the broader language and then having to
translate back to more concrete examples like laces, buttons, and zippers. Put
differently, there is no additional information communicated by a phrase like
“substantially circular” as compared to using the word “circular” in a setting
where every reader knows to think “and equivalents” when interpreting that
language.49 The extra verbiage is just a cost, both for the inventor who must think
to write it and for the reader who must parse it before understanding the core
concept.50
III. Policy Prescriptions
My disagreement with Meurer and Nard is at this point easy to crystallize.
They believe that institutional concerns are the central issue that should guide a
normative theory of the doctrine of equivalents, and they believe that those
institutional concerns cut strongly against broad reliance on the doctrine. I, on
the other hand, see patent scope as an important and maybe the dominant
consideration on which any such normative theory should rely, and I am in
addition less certain about how the various institutional issues actually cut. Thus
far, I have played out these differences by focusing on scenarios where Meurer
and Nard believe that the relevant patent applicants could have written adequate
literal claims if only they had invested more heavily in claim refinement. In the
first half of this Section, I turn to a special set of cases where even Meurer and
But see Refinement at [24] (urging the use of “words of degree” like “substantially” and
“about”).
50 I do not mean by this to reopen the classic debate over whether inventors should be asked to
claim inventions by articulating the outer limits of their inventive principle—what is called
“peripheral claiming”—or instead by clearly describing their actual invention and allowing
patent system rules and doctrines to define appropriate scope from there. I naturally have views
on that question; but here I simply mean to point out that peripheral claiming has no value when
it communicates no additional information.
49
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Nard concede that patent applicants cannot draft literal claims that would
replicate the coverage offered by the doctrine of equivalents, and I show that in
those cases, too, our basic disagreement persists.
In the second half of this Section, I focus on the relationship between the
Patent Office and the federal courts. Meurer and Nard are fans of the Patent
Office. They criticize the doctrine of equivalents on the ground that it “displaces
the judgment of the Patent Office” and substitutes instead “the judgment of the
fact‐finder at trial regarding the breadth of the patent rights.”51 And the principle
reform they advocate—increased emphasis on original claim language and
reduced opportunities for equivalents analysis—would serve to increase the
importance of Patent Office decision‐making while simultaneously decreasing
the role played by judges and juries. Here, I therefore consider whether a shift in
decision‐making power is a good thing, or whether instead there are advantages
to leaving some details of patent scope to the courts.
A. Later‐Developed Technology
Meurer and Nard consider as a special case instances where the product that
would infringe under the doctrine of equivalents makes use of some component
that was neither invented nor imagined at the time the literal claim language was
drafted.52 My tennis shoe hypothetical provides a concrete example. One can
imagine the inventor of the tennis shoe crafting a series of patent claims explicitly
asserting protection for shoes with laces, shoes with zippers, and shoes with
buttons; but that inventor would never have anticipated the invention of Velcro,
let alone thought to explicitly point out that tennis shoes that use Velcro as a
fastening mechanism are still tennis shoes for the purposes of the patent. Velcro

51
52

Refinement at [6].
Refinement at [42‐44].
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would thus be what Meurer and Nard label an “unforeseen, later‐developed”
technology. A tennis shoe using Velcro might be an equivalent,53 but it is highly
unlikely that such a shoe would literally infringe even the most carefully crafted
original claim language.
In cases involving unforeseen technology, Meurer and Nard again focus on
institutional considerations rather than patent scope. Their institutional
argument is clever. Even without protection, patent applicants will not in these
instances invest excessively in claim refinement because applicants will know
that “these types of equivalents are conceptually unattainable no matter the
amount of time and money spent on refinement efforts.”54 Thus, Meurer and
Nard argue that there is no reason to extend patent protection to cover these
technologies. Protection will impose a cost—the uncertainty unavoidably
associated with any flexible rule that allows literal claim language to expand to
encompass technology that is not literally described—but no offsetting benefit,
because in these special cases there is no associated reduction in the applicant’s
costs of drafting.55 As for patent scope, Meurer and Nard think it a red herring.
Incentives, they say, “are not much affected by a minute probability” that an
invention like Velcro will come along and undermine otherwise‐adequate patent
claims.56
My take, not surprisingly, differs sharply. In my view, the only way to
understand the Velcro hypothetical is to focus on the very incentives that Meurer
and Nard dismiss. Consider first their argument that incentives are not much
The Supreme Court has held that the time for determining equivalency is the time of
infringement, not the time of application or issuance, and thus courts can find a product to be
equivalent even if the product makes use of some component that was after‐invented. See Warner‐
Jenkinson, supra note 1, at 37.
54 Refinement at [8].
55 Id.
56 Id.
53
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affected by the chance that some new technology will come along. While I agree
that the inventor of the tennis shoe likely did not much worry about Velcro
specifically, every inventor is painfully aware that, over the twenty year patent
period, new inventions will come forward and render ineffective previously
adequate claim language. This is in fact strongly analogous to the conventional
case where an inventor worries that competitors will find some literal loophole
in his final claim language. Inventors never know exactly where the weakness in
their claim language will lie, but they do know that language imperfections are a
real threat to patent scope but for the protection offered by the doctrine of
equivalents.
More generally, here again Meurer and Nard see institutional issues, and I
again see questions about incentives, rewards for innovation, pressures to
coordinate, opportunities to imitate—in short, issues of patent scope. For
example, if Velcro tennis shoes are deemed to fall outside the scope of the tennis
shoe patent, the economic value of that patent will be decimated. Velcro tennis
shoes will fully replace lace shoes in markets where ease of removal is essential,
and Velcro shoes will also compete with lace shoes in every other market. That
competition will drive tennis shoe prices down and in essence change the tennis
shoe monopoly into a duopoly or perhaps a competitive market, depending on
whether Velcro itself is patented. Surely that will affect the long‐run incentive to
develop products like tennis shoes. Meanwhile, the decision about whether
Velcro tennis shoes come within the scope of the tennis shoe patent will also
have serious implications for the incentive to develop new technologies like
Velcro. After all, if Velcro shoes are deemed to fall outside the scope of the tennis
shoe patent, the incentive to create technologies like Velcro will drastically
increase: invent the next Velcro, and you not only earn profits based on the
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marginal value of your new fastening mechanism, but you also earn at least a
partial share of the tennis shoe market as well! Then again, maybe the incentive
is not that good, given that this rule reduces the incentive to create products like
tennis shoes, and, without products like tennis shoes, of what value would the
next Velcro be?
I could play out this interaction at some length, but my basic message is by
this point transparent: the question of whether Velcro tennis shoes should be
deemed equivalent to conventional tennis shoes is not merely a question about
the costs of patent drafting; it is more broadly another version of patent law’s
fundamental question about how best to calibrate private incentives to innovate,
disclose, coordinate, and imitate. Patent scope is at stake, just like it was in cases
outside this narrow class of unforeseen, later‐developed technologies.57
B. The Patent Office and the Courts
Many patent doctrines work to define the balance of power between the
Patent Office on the one hand, and the federal courts on the other. The doctrine
of prosecution history estoppel, for example, empowers the Patent Office to
extract from a patent applicant certain concessions that will bind that applicant
even if a court later determines the concessions were unnecessary.58 The doctrine

To put my argument in slightly different terms: we can imagine good arguments against a
rule that would deem Velcro tennis shoes to infringe the original tennis shoe patent, and we can
imagine good arguments in favor of such a rule. None of those arguments, however, would turn
on whether the original patent described the invention as having “laces,” “fasteners,” or
“mechanisms by which to tightly close around the feet.” All of those phrases give would‐be
competitors similar notice about what the actual invention is; the legal analysis should therefore
turn on the ramifications for innovation policy, not on institutional issues or questions about
what language was used in the original patent claims.
58 See Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 154 n.15
(2004) (noting the even if the examiner incorrectly construes the prior art, any concession made in
response is still binding). Absent immediate appeal, patent examiners thus have three basic
powers with respect to scope articulation: they determine the scope of the literal claims; they in
certain instances rule out the possibility of expanded scope by putting in place estoppels; and
57
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of equivalents meanwhile empowers the federal courts to broaden patent scope
beyond the contours originally deemed appropriate by the Patent Office. The
various proposals put forward by Meurer and Nard would have their own
implications along these lines. Specifically, an increase in the emphasis placed on
literal claim language combined with a reduction in the availability of the
doctrine of equivalents would shift decision‐making authority toward the Patent
Office and away from the courts. In this section, I briefly explain why that might
not be a beneficial reform.59
Start with the identity of the relevant decision‐maker. Meurer and Nard
might be right to favor patent examiners over judges and juries, in that
examiners are typically trained in the technologies they evaluate, whereas judges
and juries are at best talented generalists.60 If this were the only consideration in
play, I myself would be tempted to endorse rules that shift power toward the
Patent Office, especially if those rules could be combined with other reforms like
an adjustment to the administrative rules that today reward patent examiners for
approving patent applications but offer no similar incentive to reject or narrow
patent claims.61 The important point, however, is that the identity of the decision‐
they sign off on the pattern of dependent claims, which are the claims that will serve as fall‐back
positions for the patentee in the event that one of the broader independent claims turns out to be
invalid. Courts, meanwhile, construe the literal claims, determine the scope of equivalents
protection, and reject claims that should not have been issued. Courts somewhat surprisingly do
not have the power to “blue pencil” an invalid claim.
59 My remarks in this Part sharpen and develop my earlier discussion in Lichtman, supra note
58, at 175‐80.
60 For a somewhat sobering series of papers on how judges and juries perform in patent cases,
see Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497 (2003); Kimberly A.
Moore, Jury Demands: Who’s Asking?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 847 (2002) (symposium); Kimberly
A. Moore, Judges, Juries & Patent Cases: An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 98 MICH. L. REV. 365
(2000).
61 Gregory Aharonian offers an almost‐daily newsletter where he catalogs the various
incentive problems caused by the rules and structure of the modern Patent Office. Some of the
commentary is flamboyant, but for anyone trying to think about the reality of patent
examination, this is a must‐read resource. Links and information at http://www.bustpatents.com.
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maker is only a small part of what is at stake in this balance of power. Also at
stake is the timing of the intervention: the Patent Office weighs in at the start of
the process, whereas courts get involved only after an actual controversy is at
hand. That difference matters tremendously, and it should at least make us
hesitate before shifting too much authority away from the courts.
Two of the relevant factors I already covered earlier in my Response. The
principle argument in favor of early intervention is that an early clear statement
of patent scope makes it easier for rivals to anticipate the patent’s contours and
either invent around the patent or strike a deal with the patent holder.62 An
argument against early intervention is that delay typically yields information, as
experience with the invention renders clear the technology’s core attributes.63 But
there are still three additional factors to consider. First, delay makes adversarial
review possible. When patent applications are first filed, the application itself is
kept secret,64 and, even if it were public, the invention would typically be
insufficiently mature to attract attention from the right parties. The early process
therefore cannot be adversarial but must instead be a private conversation
between an applicant and his examiner. By the time judges and juries are
involved, by contrast, rivals know about the existence of the patent and also have
a sense of its implications for the market. The result is that rivals can at that point

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text. The broader point here is that patent law regularly
and rightly distinguishes the task of describing an invention from the task of defining
appropriate patent scope. Description can be well accomplished at the time an application is first
filed; scope, however, is often better determined later in time when more information is available.
64 The reason for secrecy is that it preserves for the applicant the option to return to trade
secret law in the event that the application must be withdrawn or is for some reason rejected.
Modern law has already begun to chip away at this protection; today, most patent applications
are published 18 months are they are first filed. See Lichtman, supra note 58, at 156‐57. One
wonders whether further steps in this direction might be appropriate. Patent applicants could
even be forced to make a binding election at the moment of application: either try for a patent, or
maintain secrecy, but not both.
62
63
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come forward with helpful information about the prior art and with arguments
about what the appropriate patent scope should be.
Second, delay means that the patent system can focus its resources. The
Patent Office cannot afford to convene the National Academy of Sciences every
time a patent application is filed, and thus the initial process of patent review is
by necessity quite spare. For that tiny subset of patents that are of sufficient
import to warrant litigation, however, courts and litigants can invest
significantly more resources in fact‐finding and analysis, the probable result
again being better decisions from a public policy perspective. This is Mark
Lemley’s point about “rational ignorance”; it makes sense to design the patent
system such that patent applications are in the beginning reviewed casually,
because that conserves resources for use later in the process when a small
number of patents emerge as influential and thus worthy of more serious
review.65
Third and most subtly, delay helps to mitigate the consequences of
unavoidable randomness in the decision‐making process. Suppose, for example,
that patent examiners and federal courts both sometimes make arbitrary
decisions, for instance because they misunderstand a critical aspect of the
claimed technology or because everyone on occasion has a bad day. When that
randomness touches patent examiners, its implications are difficult to avoid.
Every patent applicant is subject to the random draw, and thus every patentee
must react by altering behavior according to the random outcome. Receive a
patent that is mistakenly too narrow, and the incentive to invest in
commercialization and further development is reduced. Receive a patent that is
See Lemley, supra note 30. I should point out that many of us worry that Lemley
underestimates the trouble that errant patents cause. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges,
Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Wonʹt Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and
Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004).
65

27

Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents

mistakenly too broad, and all of a sudden what might have been a competitive
market is now more likely to fall victim to monopolistic pricing and practices.66
When power is lodged with the courts, however, very few patentees actually
experience their random draw. Most patent holders settle infringement disputes
in the shadow of the courts, rarely filing suit let alone actually litigating all the
way through to a final verdict. This means that any randomness that affects the
courts has significantly less bite than comparable randomness at the Patent
Office. If there is a 25% chance that the courts will wrongly deny a meritorious
claim and an offsetting 25% chance that the courts will accidentally give away
the store, parties negotiating in the shadow of the courts will make basically the
same decisions that they would have made had the courts been 100% sure to get
the case exactly right every time. Mitigation of the implications of arbitrary
decision‐making is therefore yet another factor to consider in this tradeoff
between the Patent Office and the federal courts, and thus yet another variable
that would have to be considered in order to evaluate from a policy perspective
the relative allure of the various reforms championed by Meurer and Nard.
IV. Conclusion
Thus far, I have structured all of my comments as responses to Mike Meurer
and Craig Nard’s obviously provocative work. In conclusion, I want to shift
gears and endeavor to explain why it is that I have written to defend equivalents
analysis and why I still believe that the doctrine of equivalents should play a
significant role in patent interpretation.
One virtue of the doctrine of equivalents is that it can expand patent scope to
cover variations on an invention that the inventor himself could not possibly
have described in words at the time of his original patent application. As I
66

I consider the problem of examiner inconsistency in Lichtman, supra note 58, at 170‐75.
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emphasize in Part I of this Response, patent applicants cannot anticipate every
insubstantial variation that a competitor might try, nor can they articulate in
general and abstract terms every detail of a genuinely new invention. The
doctrine of equivalents thus plays an important role in ensuring that patent
protection is more than an empty gesture. It empowers courts to read between
the lines of the patent document and protect inventions when for some reason
the literal words have missed their mark. As a result, a malevolent copyist cannot
escape the scope of protection simply by searching out a weakness in the patent
language; and a patentee is still protected even against an infringer who
innocently stumbles upon a hole in the patent’s claims.
A second virtue of the doctrine of equivalents is that it lowers the costs of
claim drafting by obviating the need to write perfect claims. In certain instances,
an applicant can perfectly articulate a comprehensive literal claim and would do
so if that were the only way to achieve the desired scope of protection. My
argument in Part II, however, is that from a social perspective the costs of writing
perfect literal claims are often unwarranted. This is true in part because many
claims are sufficiently clear even when literally imperfect. It is true in part
because most patent claims are never read anyway. And it is true in part because
perfect claims can be both more cumbersome and less informative than simpler
but technically imperfect alternatives.
A third and final virtue of the doctrine of equivalents is that it brings
additional information to the question of patent scope.67 This is the main
argument I pursue in Part III. The original patent document is written and
evaluated in an information‐poor environment. No one knows how the invention

Recall my analogy to the “objective factors” that are used to evaluate obviousness. Like the
information I discuss here, that information is used during litigation even though it is not
available at the time of patent prosecution. See supra note 31.
67
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will mature and what its economic implications will be. No one knows how
much to spend evaluating the patent application or, at the extreme, whether to
bother evaluating it at all. And only the applicant and his examiner are involved
in the conversation anyway, because the process is largely secret. But the
doctrine of equivalents is not constrained in these ways. Its analysis takes place
after the invention has matured at least in part, after rivals have had an
opportunity to evaluate the patent’s relative importance, and as part of an
adversarial interaction designed to bring information to the fore. Against this
backdrop, it seems almost silly to focus too heavily on the patent document, the
output of a process that suffers from so many comparative disadvantages.
None of this is to imply that the doctrine of equivalents has no faults. The
doctrine makes patent scope less certain and through that stands in the way of
negotiation and compliance efforts.68 The doctrine also might encourage
applicants to skimp on claim drafting—which would be problematic if true,69
although I doubt that many such cases actually exist.70 More troubling, the

The doctrine’s uncertain contours also admittedly increase the efficacy of what Mike Meurer
calls “opportunistic and anticompetitive” patent litigation. See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling
Opportunistic and Anticompetitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B. C. L. REV. 509 (2003).
69 This is one of the major concerns that Meurer and Nard emphasize: the doctrine of
equivalents reduces the incentive to draft comprehensive literal claims by protecting inventors
even in cases where their literal claims fall short. See, e.g., Refinement at [37] (proposition 3). An
example might be an applicant who carelessly uses the word “square” to describe his invention
rather than clarifying that the real requirement is that the invention be (say) a “four‐sided
polygon” or a “parallelogram.” The doctrine of equivalents arguably encourages this sort of
sloppiness by providing a safety net for applicants who make literal mistakes. Economists will
recognize the problem here as a problem of moral hazard.
70 I am dubious because other patent rules already discourage sloppy drafting, specifically by
making sure that literal protection is much more attractive to an applicant than is protection
under the doctrine of equivalents. For example, it is difficult to win a case on summary judgment
if the infringement is actionable only under the doctrine of equivalents, because equivalence is a
question of fact that normally requires a trial. See Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner‐Jenkinson
Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520‐21 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). Similarly, equivalence is subject to a long list
of arbitrary and ever‐changing doctrinal limitations: prosecution history estoppel, the “all
elements” rule, and so on. And the doctrine is a frequent target of Federal Circuit hostility. See,
68
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doctrine combines with other patent rules to discourage applicants from
submitting broad but borderline claims to the Patent Office for review. The
reason is that a rejected claim creates an estoppel that bars the applicant from
later using the doctrine of equivalents to capture the now‐rejected scope, but a
claim that was never submitted has no effect and thus leaves fully intact the
possibility of protection under the doctrine of equivalents.71
These and other concerns are serious problems and they cry out for reform.
For instance, perhaps the doctrine can be adjusted to explicitly ask questions
about the costs an applicant would have incurred had he drafted better literal
language ex ante and/or the benefits competitors would have enjoyed had that
better literal language been in place.72 Indeed, the most striking aspect of the
doctrine of equivalents is that it today says nothing about these two clearly
relevant issues, settling instead for a general statement that patent claims should
be read to cover any substantially similar invention that performs “the same
function, in the same way, to achieve the same result”—as if the doctrine of
e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (reversing the Federal
Circuit’s estoppel rule, a rule that would have very nearly repealed the doctrine of equivalents).
For the most part, then, I do not expect applicants to neglect literal language that would have
been inexpensive to draft. The doctrine of equivalents is a safety net, but it is too precarious a
protection to much discourage applicants from drafting the best literal claims reasonably within
their reach.
71 Polk Wagner favors this pattern of events, presumably because he thinks that the Patent
Office is too likely to allow broad claims, and thus he would rather not see them brought in the
first place. See Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo,
151 U. PENN L. REV. 159 (2002). The ideal rule in this context would combine both insights: it
would punish applicants for bringing an obviously overbroad claim to the Patent Office, and it
would deny protection for otherwise‐valid claims that reasonably could have been brought but
were not.
72 Then again, a more careful rule would increase the costs of litigation by providing another
axis for adversarial bickering, and this particular rule would be dangerously vulnerable to
hindsight bias—which is to say that courts might too readily believe that a reasonable patent
applicant would have known the difference between the word “adjoining” and the word
“adjacent” (my example from footnote 17) and would also have known that a computer system
should not only “selectively forward” data but also allow data to be stored and retrieved at the
user’s convenience (my example from footnote 16).
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equivalents should apply no matter what the reason for the literal imperfection
and no matter what costs that error might impose on others. Even the rule of
prosecution history estoppel says more, inquiring as to whether, at the time the
estoppel was generated, “one skilled in the art could [reasonably have been]
expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed” the
invention otherwise being barred.73
Nevertheless, my bottom line is that it would be a mistake to see the flaws
associated with the doctrine of equivalents and conclude that the doctrine should
no longer enjoy a central place in patent interpretation. The doctrine serves too
important a role in the three dimensions I have emphasized: it ensures that
patent protection remains viable despite the limitations of language and
foresight; it discourages wasteful efforts to perfect claim language where
perfection is inefficient; and it empowers the patent system to make better
decisions by bringing into the process information that is for various reasons
unavailable early in the life of a patent. No other patent system mechanism
accomplishes these three objectives as completely. Returning to the title of this
Response, perhaps my real message is therefore that in certain critical respects
the doctrine of equivalents has no substitutes—not the reissue proceeding, not
the use of continuation applications, and certainly not more aggressive attempts
at literal claim drafting.

See Festo, supra note 70, at 741. The Festo decision on its face applies only to cases where an
estoppel has been raised, but I wonder whether this same duty of reasonable care might be
beneficially expanded to straightforward equivalents disputes. Perhaps the best arguments
against such an expansion are the concerns I raise in footnote 72: the cost of the inquiry and the
risk of hindsight bias.
73
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